The Great Inflation was the defining macroeconomic event of the twentieth century’s second half. After the roughly two decades it lasted, the worldwide monetary system built during World War II was abandoned, four economic recessions occurred, two catastrophic energy shortages occurred, and wage and price restrictions were implemented for the first time in peacetime. It was “the worst failure of American macroeconomic policy in the postwar century,” according to one eminent economist (Siegel 1994).
However, that failure ushered in a paradigm shift in macroeconomic theory and, ultimately, the laws that now govern the Federal Reserve and other central banks across the world. If the Great Inflation was the result of a major blunder in American macroeconomic policy, its defeat should be celebrated.
Forensics of the Great Inflation
Inflation was a bit over 1% per year in 1964. It had been in the area for the last six years. Inflation began to rise in the mid-1960s, reaching a high of more than 14% in 1980. In the second half of the 1980s, it had dropped to an average of barely 3.5 percent.
While economists dispute the relative importance of the causes that have spurred and sustained inflation for more than a decade, there is little disagreement about where it comes from. The actions of the Federal Reserve, which allowed for an excessive expansion in the quantity of money, were at the root of the Great Inflation.
It would be helpful to describe the story in three distinct but related parts to comprehend this phase of particularly terrible policy, particularly monetary policy. This is a kind of forensic examination into the motive, means, and opportunity for the Great Inflation to happen.
The Motive: The Phillips Curve and the Pursuit of Full Employment
The first section of the story, the motivation behind the Great Inflation, takes place in the immediate aftermath of the Great Depression, a period in macroeconomic theory and policy that was similarly momentous. Following World War II, Congress focused on programs that it anticipated would foster better economic stability. The Employment Act of 1946 was the most prominent of the new legislation. The act, among other things, stated that the federal government’s role is to “advance maximum employment, production, and purchasing power” and called for more coordination between fiscal and monetary policy. 1 The Federal Reserve’s current twin mandate to “maintain long-run expansion of the monetary and credit aggregates…in order to achieve effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates” is based on this legislation (Steelman 2011).
The orthodoxy that guided policy in the postwar era was Keynesian stabilization policy, which was driven in part by the painful memory of the unprecedented high unemployment in the United States and around the world during the 1930s. The fundamental focus of these policies was the regulation of aggregate expenditure (demand) through the fiscal authority’s spending and taxation policies, as well as the central bank’s monetary policies. The notion that monetary policy can and should be used to manage aggregate spending and stabilize economic activity remains a widely held belief that governs the Federal Reserve’s and other central banks’ operations today. However, one crucial and incorrect assumption in the implementation of stabilization policy in the 1960s and 1970s was that unemployment and inflation had a stable, exploitable relationship. In particular, it was widely assumed that permanently lower unemployment rates could be “purchased” with somewhat higher inflation rates.
The idea that the “Phillips curve” indicated a longer-term trade-off between unemployment, which was very destructive to economic well-being, and inflation, which was sometimes seen as more of a nuisance, was an appealing assumption for policymakers who sought to enforce the Employment Act’s requirements.
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But the Phillips curve’s stability was a dangerous assumption, as economists Edmund Phelps (1967) and Milton Friedman (1968) cautioned. “If the statical’optimum’ is chosen,” Phelps says, “it is logical to assume that participants in product and labor markets will learn to expect inflation…and that, as a result of their rational, anticipatory behavior, the Phillips Curve will progressively shift upward…” Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1967). In other words, the authorities’ desired trade-off between reduced unemployment and higher inflation would almost certainly be a false bargain, requiring ever higher inflation to maintain.
The Means: The Collapse of Bretton Woods
If the Federal Reserve’s policies were well-anchored, chasing the Phillips curve in search of lower unemployment would not have been possible. Through the Bretton Woods agreement in the 1960s, the US dollar was tied if shakily to gold. As a result, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the severance of the US dollar from its last link to gold play a part in the story of the Great Inflation.
During World War II, the world’s industrial nations agreed to a worldwide monetary system, which they thought would promote global trade and offer more economic stability and peace. The Bretton Woods system, hammered out by forty-four nations in New Hampshire in July 1944, established a fixed rate of exchange between the world’s currencies and the US dollar, with the latter linked to gold.3
The Bretton Woods system, on the other hand, had a number of faults in its implementation, the most serious of which was the attempt to maintain constant parity across world currencies, which was incompatible with their domestic economic goals. Many countries were pursuing monetary policies that claimed to move up the Phillips curve, resulting in a more favorable unemployment-inflation nexus.
The US dollar faced an additional challenge as the world’s reserve currency. The need for US dollar reserves expanded in tandem with global trade. For a period, an expanding balance of payments deficit met the demand for US dollars, and foreign central banks accumulated ever-increasing dollar reserves. The amount of dollar reserves held overseas eventually exceeded the US gold stock, meaning that the US could not sustain total convertibility at the current gold pricea fact that foreign governments and currency speculators were quick to note.
As inflation rose in the second half of the 1960s, more US dollars were changed to gold, and in the summer of 1971, President Richard Nixon put a stop to foreign central banks exchanging dollars for gold. The short-lived Smithsonian Agreement attempted to save the global monetary system during the next two years, but the new arrangement performed no better than Bretton Woods and quickly fell apart. The worldwide monetary system that had existed since World War II had come to an end.
Most of the world’s currencies, including the US dollar, were now entirely unanchored after the last link to gold was destroyed. Except during times of global crisis, this was the first time in history that the industrialized world’s currencies were based on an irredeemable paper money standard.
The Opportunity: Fiscal Imbalances, Energy Shortages, and Bad Data
The US economy was in a state of flux throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s. At a time when the US economic situation was already stressed by the Vietnam War, President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society Act ushered in large spending programs across a broad range of social initiatives. The monetary policy was complicated by the developing budgetary imbalances.
The Federal Reserve used a “even-keel” policy approach to avoid monetary policy actions that would conflict with the Treasury’s funding plans. In practice, this meant that the central bank would not change policy and would maintain interest rates at their current levels during the time between the announcement of a Treasury issuance and its market sale. Treasury difficulties were rare under normal circumstances, and the Fed’s even-keeled policies didn’t obstruct monetary policy implementation considerably. The Federal Reserve’s adherence to the even-keel principle, however, became progressively limited as debt difficulties became more prominent (Meltzer 2005).
The periodic energy crises, which raised oil prices and stifled US GDP, were a more disruptive force. The first crisis was a five-month-long Arab oil embargo that began in October 1973. Crude oil prices quadrupled at this time, reaching a plateau that lasted until 1979, when the Iranian revolution triggered a second energy crisis. The price of oil tripled during the second crisis.
In the 1970s, economists and policymakers began to classify increases in aggregate prices into various inflation kinds. Macroeconomic policy, particularly monetary policy, had a direct influence on “demand-pull” inflation. It was caused by policies that resulted in expenditure levels that were higher than what the economy could produce without pushing the economy beyond its normal productive capacity and requiring the use of more expensive resources. However, supply interruptions, particularly in the food and energy industries, might push inflation higher (Gordon 1975). 4 This “cost-push” inflation was also passed on to consumers in the form of higher retail prices.
Inflation driven by the growing price of oil was mainly beyond the control of monetary policy, according to the central bank. However, the increase in unemployment that occurred as a result of the increase in oil prices was not.
The Federal Reserve accommodated huge and rising budget imbalances and leaned against the headwinds created by energy costs, motivated by a duty to generate full employment with little or no anchor for reserve management. These policies hastened the money supply expansion and increased overall prices without reducing unemployment.
Policymakers were also hampered by faulty data (or, at the very least, a lack of understanding of the facts). Looking back at the data available to policymakers in the run-up to and during the Great Inflation, economist Athanasios Orphanides found that the real-time estimate of potential output was significantly overstated, while the estimate of the unemployment rate consistent with full employment was significantly understated. To put it another way, officials were probably underestimating the inflationary effects of their measures as well. In reality, they couldn’t continue on their current policy path without rising inflation (Orphanides 1997; Orphanides 2002).
To make matters worse, the Phillips curve began to fluctuate, indicating that the Federal Reserve’s policy actions were being influenced by its stability.
From High Inflation to Inflation TargetingThe Conquest of US Inflation
Friedman and Phelps were correct. The previously stable inflation-unemployment trade-off has become unstable. Policymakers’ power to regulate any “real” variable was fleeting. This included the unemployment rate, which fluctuated about its “natural” level. The trade-off that policymakers were hoping to take advantage of didn’t exist.
As businesses and families began to appreciate, if not anticipate, rising prices, any trade-off between inflation and unemployment became a less favorable trade-off until both inflation and unemployment reached unacceptably high levels. This became known as the “stagflationary age.” When this narrative began in 1964, inflation was at 1% and unemployment was at 5%. Inflation would be over 12% and unemployment would be over 7% ten years later. Inflation was near 14.5 percent in the summer of 1980, while unemployment was over 7.5 percent.
Officials at the Federal Reserve were not ignorant to the escalating inflation, and they were fully aware of the dual mandate, which required monetary policy to be calibrated to achieve full employment and price stability. Indeed, the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act, more generally known as the Humphrey-Hawkins Act after the bill’s authors, re-codified the Employment Act of 1946 in 1978. Humphrey-Hawkins tasked the Federal Reserve with pursuing full employment and price stability, as well as requiring the central bank to set growth targets for several monetary aggregates and submit a semiannual Monetary Policy Report to Congress. 5 When full employment and inflation collided, however, the employment part of the mandate appeared to have the upper hand. Full employment was the foremost objective in the minds of the people and the government, if not also at the Federal Reserve, as Fed Chairman Arthur Burns would later declare (Meltzer 2005). However, there was a general consensus that confronting the inflation problem head-on would be too costly to the economy and jobs.
Attempts to reduce inflation without the costly side effect of increasing unemployment had been made in the past. Between 1971 and 1974, the Nixon government implemented wage and price controls in three stages. These measures only delayed the rise in prices for a short time while aggravating shortages, particularly in food and energy. The Ford administration did not fare any better. Following his declaration of inflation as “enemy number one,” President Gerald Ford initiated the Whip Inflation Now (WIN) initiative in 1974, which included voluntary steps to encourage increased thrift. It was a colossal flop.
By the late 1970s, the public had come to anticipate monetary policy to be inflationary. They were also becoming increasingly dissatisfied with inflation. In the latter half of the 1970s, survey after survey revealed a deterioration in popular confidence in the economy and government policy. Inflation was frequently singled out as a particular scourge. Since 1965, interest rates have appeared to be on the rise, and as the 1970s drew to a conclusion, they jumped even higher. Business investment stagnated, productivity fell, and the country’s trade balance with the rest of the globe worsened during this time. Inflation was largely seen as either a substantial contributing factor or the primary cause of the economic downturn.
However, once the country was in the midst of unacceptably high inflation and unemployment, officials were confronted with a difficult choice. Combating high unemployment would almost surely drive inflation even higher, while combating inflation would almost certainly cause unemployment to rise much more.
Paul Volcker, formerly of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, was elected chairman of the Federal Reserve Board in 1979. Year-over-year inflation was above 11 percent when he assumed office in August, and national unemployment was slightly under 6 percent. By this time, it was widely understood that lowering inflation necessitated tighter control over the pace of increase of reserves in particular, as well as broad money in general. As mandated by the Humphrey-Hawkins Act, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) had already began setting targets for monetary aggregates. However, it was evident that with the new chairman, attitude was shifting and that greater measures to restrict the expansion of the money supply were needed. The FOMC announced in October 1979 that instead of using the fed funds rate as a policy tool, it would target reserve growth.
Fighting inflation was now considered as important to meet both of the dual mandate’s goals, even if it temporarily disrupted economic activity and resulted in a greater rate of unemployment. “My core idea is that over time we have no choice but to deal with the inflationary situation since inflation and the unemployment rate go together,” Volcker declared in early 1980. Isn’t that what the 1970s taught us?” (Meltzer, 1034, 2009).
While not perfect, better control of reserve and money expansion over time resulted in a desired slowdown of inflation. The establishment of credit limits in early 1980, as well as the Monetary Control Act, aided this stricter reserve management. Interest rates surged, decreased for a short time, and then spiked again in 1980. Between January and July, lending activity decreased, unemployment increased, and the economy experienced a temporary recession. Even as the economy improved in the second half of 1980, inflation declined but remained high.
The Volcker Fed, on the other hand, kept up the pressure on rising inflation by raising interest rates and slowing reserve growth. In July 1981, the economy suffered another recession, this time more severe and long-lasting, lasting until November 1982. Unemployment peaked at over 11%, but inflation continued to fall, and by the conclusion of the recession, year-over-year inflation had dropped below 5%. As the Fed’s commitment to low inflation gained traction, unemployment fell and the economy entered a period of steady growth and stability. The Great Inflation had come to an end.
Macroeconomic theory had undergone a metamorphosis by this time, influenced in large part by the economic lessons of the day. In macroeconomic models, the importance of public expectations in the interaction between economic policy and economic performance has become standard. The need of time-consistent policy choicespolicies that do not sacrifice long-term prosperity for short-term gainsas well as policy credibility became widely recognized as essential for excellent macroeconomic outcomes.
Today’s central banks recognize that price stability is critical to sound monetary policy, and several, like the Federal Reserve, have set specific numerical inflation targets. These numerical inflation targets have reinstated an anchor to monetary policy to the extent that they are credible. As a result, they have improved the transparency of monetary policy decisions and reduced uncertainty, both of which are now recognized as critical preconditions for achieving long-term growth and maximum employment.
When did the inflationary period begin?
The US economy grew in fits and starts before the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 established the Federal Reserve. Following periods of fast inflation and asset price increase, severe shocks and panics occurred. The United States underwent four episodes of double-digit inflation between 1775 and 1913.
When did inflation reach its peak?
Between 1914 and 2022, the United States’ inflation rate averaged 3.25 percent, with a high of 23.70 percent in June 1920 and a low of -15.80 percent in June 1921.
When was the last time there was inflation?
SNELL: So, Scott, the last time inflation was this high, Ronald Reagan was in the White House, Olivia Newton-John was everywhere on the radio, and the cool new computer was the Commodore 64, which was named after its 64 kilobytes of capacity. Oh, and a new soft drink was set to hit the market.
(Singing) Introducing Diet Coke, UNIDENTIFIED PERSON. You’ll drink it only for the sake of tasting it.
SNELL: Before Diet Coke, there was a period. And, while it feels like a long time ago, Scott, how close are we to having to go through it all again?
HORSLEY: Kelsey, you have to keep in mind that inflation was really decreasing in 1982. It had been significantly higher, nearly twice as high as it was in 1980, when annual inflation reached 14.6 percent…
HORSLEY:…Nearly twice as much as it is now. And inflation had been high for the greater part of a decade at the time. High inflation plagued Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter. And by the time Reagan took office, Americans had grown accustomed to price increases that seemed to go on forever.
REAGAN, RONALD: Now we’ve had two years of double-digit inflation in a row: 13.3% in 1979 and 12.4 percent last year. This happened only once before, during World War I.
HORSLEY: So, in comparison to the inflation rates of the 1970s and early 1980s, today’s inflation rate doesn’t appear to be all that severe.
SO IT WAS COMING DOWN. SNELL: How did policymakers keep inflation under control back then?
HORSLEY: Well, the Federal Reserve provided some fairly unpleasant medication. Paul Volcker, then-Federal Reserve Chairman, was determined to break the back of inflation, and he was willing to raise interest rates to absurdly high levels to do it. To give you an example, mortgage rates reached 18 percent in 1981. As you may expect, that did not go down well. On the backs of wooden planks, enraged homebuilders wrote protest notes to Volcker. The Fed chairman, on the other hand, stuck to his guns. Volcker was interviewed on “The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour.”
PAUL VOLCKER: This dam is going to burst at some point, and the mentality is going to shift.
HORSLEY: Now, some people may believe we’re in for a rerun when they hear the Fed is prepared to hike interest rates once more to keep inflation in check.
HORSLEY: The rate rises we’re talking about now, though, are nothing like Volcker’s severe actions. Keep in mind that interest rates were near zero throughout the pandemic. Even if the Fed raised rates seven times this year, to 2% or something, as some experts currently predict, credit would still be extremely inexpensive by historical standards. The Fed isn’t talking about taking away the punchbowl, just substituting some of the extremely sugary punch with something closer to Diet Coke. The cheap money party has been going on for a long time, and the Fed isn’t talking about stopping it.
SNELL: (laughter) OK, so there are certainly some significant distinctions between today’s inflation and the inflation experienced by the United States in 1982. Is there, however, anything we can learn from that era?
HORSLEY: One thing to remember is that inflation is still a terrible experience. Rising prices have a significant impact on people’s perceptions of the economy, and politicians ignore this at their peril. The growing cost of rent, energy, and groceries – you know, the stuff that most of us can’t live without – were some of the major drivers of inflation last month. Abdul Ture, who works at a store outside of Washington, says his money doesn’t stretch as far as it used to, so he has to shop in smaller, more frequent increments.
ABDUL TURE: Oh no, the costs have increased. Everything has gone to hell on the inside. I now just buy a couple of items that I can utilize for two or three days. I used to be able to buy for a week. But no longer.
HORSLEY: This has an impact on people’s attitudes. Price gains are expected to ease throughout the course of the year, but inflation has already shown to be larger and more persistent than many analysts anticipated.
SNELL: However, a great deal has changed in the last 40 years. Take, for example, my cell phone. It has 100,000 times the memory of the Commodore computer we discussed earlier. Is this to say that inflation isn’t as dangerous as it once was?
HORSLEY: For the most part, it appeared as if the inflation dragon had been slain for the last few decades. Workers, for example, were assumed to have less negotiating leverage in a global economy, limiting their ability to demand greater compensation. Because the economy is no longer as reliant on oil as it was in the 1970s, oil shocks do not have the same impact. However, additional types of supply shocks occurred throughout the pandemic. And when you combine shortages of computer chips, truck drivers, and other personnel with extremely high demand, you’ve got a recipe for price increases.
SNELL: You should know that both Congress and the Federal Reserve injected trillions of dollars into the economy during the pandemic. It was an attempt to defuse the situation. So, how much of that contributed to the current level of inflation?
HORSLEY: That’s something economists will be debating for a long time. Those trillions of dollars did contribute to a fairly quick recovery. Unemployment has dropped from over 15% at the start of the pandemic to 4% presently. Could we have had a faster recovery without the huge inflationary consequences? Jason Furman, a former Obama administration economic adviser, believes that the $1.9 trillion stimulus package passed by Congress this spring went too far, even if it helped to speed up the recovery and put more people back to work.
FURMAN, JASON: I’d rather have high unemployment and low inflation than the other way around. I believe there were probably better options than either of those. I believe that if the stimulus package had been half as large, we would today have nearly the same amount of jobs and much lower inflation. Who knows, though.
HORSLEY: Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell was also questioned about whether the Fed went too far. He claims that historians will have to decide on the wisdom of the central bank’s policies in years to come. In retrospect, his cigar-chomping predecessor, Paul Volcker, looks a lot better. Look out if Powell shows up to his next press appearance with a cigar in his mouth.
OLIVIA NEWTON-JOHN: Let’s get physical, let’s get physical, let’s get physical, let’s get physical, let’s get physical, let’s get physical, let’s get physical, let’ I’d like to engage in some physical activity. Let’s get down to business. Allow me to hear your body language, body language.
Why was inflation in the 1970s so high?
- Rapid inflation occurs when the prices of goods and services in an economy grow rapidly, reducing savings’ buying power.
- In the 1970s, the United States had some of the highest rates of inflation in recent history, with interest rates increasing to nearly 20%.
- This decade of high inflation was fueled by central bank policy, the removal of the gold window, Keynesian economic policies, and market psychology.
RELATED: Inflation: Gas prices will get even higher
Inflation is defined as a rise in the price of goods and services in an economy over time. When there is too much money chasing too few products, inflation occurs. After the dot-com bubble burst in the early 2000s, the Federal Reserve kept interest rates low to try to boost the economy. More people borrowed money and spent it on products and services as a result of this. Prices will rise when there is a greater demand for goods and services than what is available, as businesses try to earn a profit. Increases in the cost of manufacturing, such as rising fuel prices or labor, can also produce inflation.
There are various reasons why inflation may occur in 2022. The first reason is that since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, oil prices have risen dramatically. As a result, petrol and other transportation costs have increased. Furthermore, in order to stimulate the economy, the Fed has kept interest rates low. As a result, more people are borrowing and spending money, contributing to inflation. Finally, wages have been increasing in recent years, putting upward pressure on pricing.
Why was 1920’s inflation so high?
“I have no reason to believe there was an over-investment boom in the 1920s,” says the author.
Professor Milton Friedman, in an ongoing exchange of letters with me, urged Austrian school supporters to present proof of an overinvestment boom in the 1920s. He reaffirmed what he and Anna Schwartz found in A Monetary History of the United States: the 1920s were the “high tide” of Federal Reserve policy, with virtually no inflation and moderate economic development. Even monetarists deny that the stock market of 1929 was overvalued! In a nutshell, “everything in the 1920s was fine.” According to Friedman, the problem was not inflation in the 1920s, but rather the “Great Contraction” of the money supply in the 1930s, which drove the economy into the worst slump in US history.
The Austrians, in contrast to Friedman and the Monetarists, contend that the Federal Reserve artificially cheapened credit and staged an unsustainable inflationary bubble throughout the 1920s. As a result, the stock market crash of 1929 and the ensuing economic disaster were unavoidable.
The fact that Irving Fisher, the most prominent Monetarist of the 1920s, utterly missed the crash, whereas Austrian economists Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek foresaw it but did not name a specific date, is an intriguing historical footnote. Since then, Monetarists have claimed that the 1929-33 financial crisis was unforeseeable and that there were little, if any, warning signs of danger in the 1920s. The Austrians, on the other hand, have attempted to substantiate Mises-claim Hayek’s that the government induced an inflationary boom that could not persist, particularly under an international gold standard.
Was the 1920s a period of overinvestment? Which statistics you look at will determine the answer. The “macro” data supports the Monetarist argument, whereas the “micro” evidence backs up the Austrian position.
The broad-based pricing indexes, which support the Monetarists, indicate little or no inflation in the 1920s. Between 1921 and 1929, average wholesale and consumer prices barely changed. The majority of commodities prices dropped. “Far from being an inflationary decade, the twenties were the polar opposite,” Friedman and Schwartz conclude.
Other evidence, on the other hand, backs up the Austrian opinion that the decade was appropriately termed the Roaring Twenties. Although the 1920s were not marked by “price” inflation, they were marked by “profit” inflation, as John Maynard Keynes put it. Following the Great Depression of the 1920s, national output (GNP) expanded at a rate of 5.2 percent per year, well above the national average (3.0 percent). Between 1921 and 1929, the Index of Manufacturing Production rose at a significantly faster rate, nearly doubling. Capital investment and corporate earnings both increased.
In the United States, as in the 1980s, there was “asset” inflation. In the mid-1920s, there was a nationwide real estate boom, including a speculative bubble in Florida that burst in 1927. Manhattan, the world’s financial capital, saw a surge as well.
On Wall Street, both in stocks and bonds, the asset bubble was most pronounced. The Dow Jones Industrial Average began its colossal bull market in late 1921, at a cyclical low of 66, and went on to reach a high of 300 by mid-1929, more than tripling in value. Industrials were up 321 percent, Railroads were up 129 percent, and Utilities were up an unbelievable 318 percent, according to the Standard & Poor’s Index of Common Stocks.
Surprisingly, the Monetarists reject the existence of any stock market orgy. “Had high employment and economic growth continued, stock market valuations could have been sustained,” Anna Schwartz believes. It’s as if they’re trying to clear Irving Fisher’s name for announcing a week before the 1929 crash that “stock prices have hit what appears to be a permanently high peak.” (The crash wiped away Fisher’s massive leveraged position in Remington Rand stock.)
The thesis of Schwartz is predicated on what appear to be respectable price-earnings ratios for most firms in 1929. (15.6 versus a norm of 13.6). P/E ratios, on the other hand, are a notoriously deceptive measure of speculative activity. While they do rise during a bull market, they grossly underestimate the level of speculation because both prices and incomes rise during a boom. When yearly national output averages 5.2 percent and the S&P Index of Common Stocks rises an average of 18.6 percent each year during the 1920s, something has to give. In fact, the economy increased by only 6.3 percent between 1927 and 1929, whereas common stocks surged by an astonishing 82.2 percent! “Trees don’t grow to the sky,” as the old Wall Street adage goes. A collision was unavoidable.
The Austrians contend that the Federal Reserve’s “cheap-credit” strategy was to blame for the twenties’ structural imbalances, whilst the Monetarists deny that there was any serious inflationary purpose. Between 1921 and 1929, the money stock (M2) increased by 46 percent, or less than 5% a year, which Monetarists do not consider excessive. On the other hand, Austrians point to the Fed’s purposeful efforts to cut interest rates, particularly between 1924 and 1927, resulting in an unjustified boom in assets and manufacturing. More crucially, the expansion of credit in the United States far outpaced the growth of gold reserves, which would mean doom for the gold exchange standard.
In conclusion, was there an inflationary imbalance sufficient to produce an economic crisis in the 1920s? The evidence is mixed, but the Austrians have a strong case. The “cheap credit” stimulus may not have been substantial in the eyes of the Monetarists, but given the fragile nature of the financial system under the international gold standard, modest modifications by the newly constituted central bank provoked a gigantic worldwide earthquake.
In 1980, why was inflation so high?
During a period of tremendous economic volatility in the 1970s, the Federal Reserve was very lenient. As a result, in 1980, the annual rate of inflation peaked at 14.8 percent, the second highest amount ever recorded.
This time, the Fed reduced short-term interest rates to near zero and injected trillions of dollars into the economy via quantitative easing, a still-controversial strategy.
In the late 1960s, the United States increased spending, and this trend continued for the next two decades, as high inflation fueled even more government spending.
Meanwhile, to minimize the damage caused by the COVID pandemic, Washington pumped $5 trillion into the economy in the form of stimulus payments to people and companies during the last year and a half.
The influx of stimulus funds far outstripped the previous full year of government spending prior to the crisis. In fiscal year 2019, the US spent $4.4 trillion.
The Fed has been forced to accelerate plans to discontinue its enormous stimulus program due to rising prices. By the middle of the year, the central bank may have begun boosting interest rates.
Under public pressure, the Biden administration is also looking for ways to lower prices.
Furthermore, when the stimulus fades and the White House’s big-spending plans run into more barriers, government expenditure is likely to fall substantially.
According to polls, Republicans are expected to take control of half or all of Congress in the 2022 midterm elections, despite the president’s $2 trillion Build Back Better bill stalling in Washington.
Any significant spending bills would very probably be blocked by a Republican-led Congress, especially under a Democratic president.
Ted Cruz is questioned why the national debt is so important to Republicans only when a Democrat is in the White House in the Capitol Report (October 2020).
See also: Goldman Sachs slashes US growth projection after Senator Joe Manchin rejects Biden’s $2 trillion spending proposal
Companies in the private sector are gradually figuring out how to deal with supply constraints and increase production through automation or other means. The supply shocks should subside by 2022, but it’s unclear if the labor deficit will be resolved as soon.
Many analysts, however, doubt that inflation will revert to pre-crisis levels of less than 2%. They claim that the longer a period of high inflation lasts, the more likely it is that some of it will become embedded in the economy.
“If we go into next fall with inflation at 3%, the Fed’s 2% long-term inflation target is out the door,” said Joel Naroff of Naroff Economic Advisors.
Read on to learn how Biden’s anti-inflation plan could make matters worse, according to Larry Summers.
In 1982, what created inflation?
The 1981-82 recession was the greatest economic slump in the United States since the Great Depression, prior to the 2007-09 recession. Indeed, the over 11% unemployment rate attained in late 1982 remains the postwar era’s pinnacle (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis). During the 1981-82 recession, unemployment was widespread, but manufacturing, construction, and the auto industries were especially hard hit. Despite the fact that goods manufacturers accounted for only 30% of overall employment at the time, they lost 90% of their jobs in 1982. Manufacturing accounted for three-quarters of all job losses in the goods-producing sector, with unemployment rates of 22% and 24%, respectively, in the home building and auto manufacturing industries (Urquhart and Hewson 1983, 4-7).
The economy was already in poor health prior to the slump, with unemployment hovering at 7.5 percent following a recession in 1980. Tight monetary policy in an attempt to combat rising inflation sparked both the 1980 and 1981-82 recessions. During the 1960s and 1970s, economists and politicians thought that raising inflation would reduce unemployment, a tradeoff known as the Phillips Curve. In the 1970s, the Fed used a “stop-go” monetary strategy, in which it alternated between combating high unemployment and high inflation. The Fed cut interest rates during the “go” periods in order to loosen the money supply and reduce unemployment. When inflation rose during the “stop” periods, the Fed raised interest rates to lessen inflationary pressure. However, as inflation and unemployment rose concurrently in the mid-1970s, the Phillips Curve tradeoff proved unstable in the long run. While unemployment was on the decline towards the end of the decade, inflation remained high, hitting 11% in June 1979. (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis).
Because of his anti-inflation ideas, Paul Volcker was chosen chairman of the Federal Reserve in August 1979. He had previously served as president of the New York Fed, where he had expressed his displeasure with Fed actions that he believed contributed to rising inflation expectations. In terms of future economic stability, he believes that rising inflation should be the Fed’s top concern: “It is what is going to give us the most troubles and cause the biggest recession” (FOMC transcript 1979, 16). He also thought the Fed had a credibility problem when it comes to controlling inflation. The Fed had proved in the preceding decade that it did not place a high priority on maintaining low inflation, and the public’s belief that this conduct would continue would make it increasingly difficult for the Fed to drive inflation down. “Failure to continue the fight against inflation now would simply make any subsequent effort more difficult,” he said (Volcker 1981b).
Instead of focusing on interest rates, Volcker altered the Fed’s policy to aggressively target the money supply. He chose this strategy for two reasons. To begin with, rising inflation made it difficult to determine which interest rate targets were suitable. Due to the expectation of inflation, the nominal interest rates the Fed targeted could be relatively high, but the real interest rates (that is, the effective interest rates after adjusting for inflation) could still be quite low. Second, the new policy was intended to show the public that the Federal Reserve was serious about keeping inflation low. The anticipation of low inflation was significant, as present inflation is influenced in part by future inflation forecasts.
Volcker’s initial efforts to reduce inflation and inflationary expectations were ineffective. The Carter administration’s credit-control scheme, which began in March 1980, triggered a severe recession (Schreft 1990). As unemployment rose, the Fed relented, reverting to the “stop-go” practices that the public had grown accustomed to. The Fed tightened the money supply further in late 1980 and early 1981, causing the federal funds rate to approach 20%. Long-term interest rates, despite this, have continued to grow. The ten-year Treasury bond rate surged from around 11% in October 1980 to more than 15% a year later, probably due to market expectations that the Fed would soften its restrictive monetary policy if unemployment soared (Goodfriend and King 2005). Volcker, on the other hand, was insistent that the Fed not back down this time: “We have set our course to control money and credit growth.” We intend to stay the course” (Volcker 1981a).
High interest rates put pressure on sectors of the economy that rely on borrowing, such as manufacturing and construction, and the economy officially entered a recession in the third quarter of 1981. Unemployment increased from 7.4% at the beginning of the recession to nearly 10% a year later. Volcker faced repeated calls from Congress to loosen monetary policy as the recession worsened, but he insisted that failing to lower long-run inflation expectations now would result in “more catastrophic economic situations over a much longer period of time” (Monetary Policy Report 1982, 67).
This perseverance paid off in the end. Inflation had dropped to 5% by October 1982, and long-term interest rates had begun to fall. The Fed permitted the federal funds rate to drop to 9%, and unemployment fell fast from over 11% at the end of 1982 to 8% a year later (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; Goodfriend and King 2005). Inflation was still a threat, and the Fed would have to deal with several “inflation scares” during the 1980s. However, Volcker’s and his successors’ dedication to actively pursue price stability helped ensure that the 1970s’ double-digit inflation did not reappear.
Why was inflation so high in the United Kingdom in the 1970s?
- The mortgage market was deregulated by the Bank of England, which meant that High Street Banks may now lend mortgages (not just local building societies). This contributed to an increase in home values and consumer wealth.
- 1972 was the year of the Barber Boom. With huge tax cuts against a backdrop of rapid economic growth, chancellor Anthony Barber made a beeline for growth in the 1972 budget.
- Credit expansion. The first widespread use of credit cards occurred in the 1970s (Access). This aided in the formation of a consumption bubble.
